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ABSTRACT 
 
Given a choice problem, the maximization rule may select many alternatives. In such 
cases, it is common practice to interpret that the final choice will end up being made by 
some random procedure, assigning to any maximal alternative the same probability of 
being chosen. However, there may be reasons based on the same original preferences 
for which it is suitable to select certain maximal alternatives over others. This paper 
introduces two choice criteria induced by the original preferences such that maximizing 
with respect to each of them may give a finer selection of alternatives than maximizing 
with respect to the original preferences. Those criteria are built by means of several 
preference relations induced by the original preferences, namely, two (weak) dominance 
relations, two indirect preference relations and the dominance relations defined with the 
help of those indirect preferences. It is remarkable that as the original preferences 
approach being complete and transitive, those criteria become both simpler and closer to 
such preferences. In particular, they coincide with the original preferences when these 
are complete and transitive, in which case they provide the same solution as those 
preferences. 
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1.- INTRODUCTION 
 
We know that when preferences are not acyclic the standard maximization choice rule 
may not solve all the choice problems that can arise within a space of alternatives. We 
also know that even when preferences are acyclic and the maximization rule selects a 
non-empty set of alternatives, that set may include more than one option, frequently too 
many. When this is the case, it is conventional to interpret that the final choice will end 
up being made by means of some random procedure, assuming that the alternatives 
selected by the rule are equivalent of sorts. However, Luce (1956) already revealed that 
in such cases there may be reasons, based on the same original preferences, for which it 
is suitable to select certain maximal alternatives ahead of others. 
 
Consider the following example: 
 
Example 1.- The alternative x is better than y, y and z are indifferent, and x and z are also 
indifferent. Maximizing over the set {x, y, z} gives {x, z}. However, there is a certain 
asymmetry in favour of x because x is strictly better than y. Hence, it makes sense to 
take {x} as a solution instead of the standard solution.  
 
Cases like this do not arise if preferences are complete and transitive. However, the 
possibility that individual preferences are not complete is familiar to any agent. 
Likewise, the possibility that individual preferences are not transitive has been 
extensively discussed in the literature. Fishburn (1991) summarizes this discussion. In 
social preferences, non-completeness and violations of transitivity are phenomena 
induced by well known aggregation rules such as the Pareto criterion and the majority 
method. 
Luce’s proposal consists of defining a new preference relation which, induced by the 
original one, serves to reject all maximal alternatives which would be worse than 
another possible alternative according to the new relation. In fact, the standard 
maximization rule may be understood as operating in two steps. In step one, all the 
alternatives that are worse than another alternative in the choice problem are precluded 
from being chosen. In step two, the non-excluded alternatives are accepted and included 
in the choice set. Thus, applying additional criteria induced by the original preferences 
for rejecting alternatives and then accepting the rest may be considered as a coherent 
way of refining the standard rule of maximizing with respect to the original preferences. 
This is what this paper aims to do. 
The authors of the above example, Begoña Subiza and Josep E. Peris, have followed 
this kind of strategy in various articles, but they have introduced more general 
discriminating criteria than the criterion introduced by Luce.1 It should be noted that 
Luce’s criterion only guarantees to give solutions when the original preferences comply 
with specific and fairly demanding properties.2 In contrast, Subiza and Peris use as an 
additional basic criterion to reject a maximal alternative, the fact of being dominated by 
another alternative included in the same group of feasible alternatives.  
Nevertheless, the additional use of this dominance criterion can result in an excessively 
large group of maximal alternatives. Because of this, it may be necessary to introduce 
                                                 
1
 Subiza and Peris (2000), (2002), (2005a) and (2005b). 
2
 Specifically, Luce assumes that the original preference relation is a semiorder.  
some additional rejection criteria. Specifically, Subiza and Peris (2005a) propose 
excluding an alternative y from being chosen if there is any alternative x that is better 
than a number of alternatives higher than y.3 
In many ways, this paper follows the line devised by those authors. In particular, it 
coincides with them on the relevance of the dominance relation as a rejection criterion. 
It also agrees with the majority of their mentioned articles by supposing that the space 
of alternatives is finite, and tries also to make as few demanding assumptions on the 
original preferences as possible. However, this paper differs in its approach in other 
ways. 
The only assumptions that are made in this paper on the original preferences are that 
they are reflexive and have no cycles. It is even shown how to apply the approach when 
such cycles exist. Thus, one relevant difference from Subiza and Peris’s approach - and 
also from the literature on tournaments - is the assumption that the original relation of 
preference is a weak one which may not be complete. In this manner, there may be 
indifferent alternatives although the relation is not complete. This assumption leads to 
distinguish between two dominance relations defined on the basis of the original 
preferences and, above all, demonstrates that the approach that is proposed in the paper 
may be more useful when the original preferences are incomplete.  
Another important difference has to do with the rejection criteria proposed in addition to 
the dominance relationships based on the original preferences. As pointed out above, 
Subiza and Peris (2005a) propose excluding any alternative y from being chosen if there 
is any alternative x that is better than a number of alternatives higher than y. Instead, this 
paper proposes to use, as additional rejection criteria, the indirect preference relations 
that can be defined on the basis of the original preferences, as well as the dominance 
relations based on those indirect preferences. 
The main reason to do so is because considering that a maximal alternative x is 
preferable to another y because the number of alternatives that are worse than x is higher 
than the number of alternatives worse than y may not be so convincing, as demonstrated 
in the following example. Alternative x1 is preferred to x2, x1is preferred to x3, x2 is 
indifferent to x3, x1 is indifferent to y1, y1 is preferred to y2, y1 is indifferent to x2, y1 is 
indifferent to x3, y2 is preferred to x2 and y2 is preferred to x3. Notice that there is an 
alternative worse than y which is preferred to any alternative x’ that is worse than x, 
namely y2. If the strict preferences were transitive, then the case would be more 
convincing because then y1 would be preferred to x2 and to x3, so that the set of the 
alternatives that are worse than y1 would be larger than the set of the alternatives that are 
worse than x1. Despite this, it is possible to build similar examples in which strict 
preferences are transitive and where, as in the example above, it is unclear whether we 
can infer that x is preferable to y. Suppose, for instance, that the preferences are as 
described in the former example in this paragraph, except that y2 is indifferent to x2 and 
y2 is indifferent to x3. It is then true that the number of the alternatives that are worse 
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 In other papers, Subiza and Peris have proposed other choice criteria. For instance, in Subiza and Peris 
(2000) propose that x should be preferable to y if x is indirectly preferred to a number of alternatives 
higher than y. Analogously, in Subiza and Peris (2002) define a further alternative rejection criteria for 
the case in which the original preference relation does not include indifference comparisons between the 
alternatives.  
 
than x is higher than the number of those that are worse than y, but every alternative 
worse than x is indifferent to all those worse than y. 
Given that the space of alternatives is finite, another feature of the paper is that it 
attempts to exploit as much as possible the information provided by the original 
preference relation throughout all the space. The information we get from this strategy 
provides us with stricter rejection criteria than we would get from considering only the 
information available in each choice problem considered, as shown in the following 
example: 
 
Example 2.- Let us suppose that in the space {x, y, z}, alternative x is better than 
alternative y, which in turn is better than z. Alternatives x and z are indifferent and the 
problem is which to choose of x and z. If we use the information available in the set {x, 
z} exclusively, neither is dominant which means the dominance relation will give us the 
same solution, {x, z}, as the maximization rule. If, on the other hand, we use the 
information available throughout the entire space {x, y, z}, the solution will be x, which 
is also intuitively the more plausible solution. 
 
Section 2 introduces the notation and the basic notions used in the paper. In particular, 
the direct dominance relations and the indirect preference and dominance relations are 
presented there. In section 3, all those relations are combined to give, through 
maximizing the resulting combined relation, a solution to any decision problem that is 
at least as selective as the solution achieved by maximizing with respect to the original 
preferences, and, in cases, it is more selective than this latter solution. However, the fact 
that the space of alternatives is finite give the additional possibility of defining a more 
demanding choice criterion such that maximizing in regard to it gives to any decision 
problem a solution which (1) is at least as selective as that given by the combined 
preference relation presented in Section 3, (2) may be more selective than it, and (3) in 
contrast with that relation, satisfies all the standard consistency conditions on choice 
functions. All this is shown in Section 4. Section 5 is merely a summary.    
  
2.- NOTATION AND BASIC NOTIONS  
Let us summarize some basic notions of choice theory. A (weak) preference relation is a 
reflexive binary relation defined on a space of alternatives X. The relation R may 
represent an agent’s preferences or it may express a social preference obtained by an 
aggregation procedure.  The expression ‘xRy’ can be read ‘option x is at least as good as 
option y’. The strict preference relation P is the asymmetric part of R, and the 
indifference relation I is its symmetric part; ‘xPy’ means ‘x is preferred to y’, or ‘x is 
better than option y’, and ‘xIy’ means ‘x and y are indifferent’. The relations P and I are 
defined as usual: (a) xPy if and only if (hereafter ‘iff’) xRy but not yRx; and (b) xIy iff 
xRy and yRx. By definition, P is asymmetric, that is, if xPy then not yPx; and I is 
symmetric, that is, if xIy then yIx. 
 
R is reflexive on set X iff for all x∈X, xRx. R is said to be complete if and only if for 
every x, y∈X, xRy or yRx. Let us write ‘x R y’ to express that neither xRy nor yRx.  
 
R is transitive iff for every x, y, z∈X, if xRy and yRz, then xRz; it is said to be quasi-
transitive when its asymmetric part P is transitive; and R is acyclic if for every sequence 
x
1
, x
2
,.., x
n
, such that xiPxi+1 for every i=, 1,2.., n-1, not xnP x1. In addition, let R be PI-
transitive when xPyIz implies xPz; and IP-transitive when xIyPz implies xPz. R is said to 
be a pre-order when it is reflexive and transitive. It is a complete pre-order if in 
addition, it is also complete.  
 
Any non-empty subset S of X represents a choice problem. A choice rule h assigns to 
any choice problem S a subset of S. This can be expressed symbolically as h(S)⊆S.  This 
subset is usually called the choice set.4 An outstanding property that a choice rule h may 
have is that it returns a non-empty set as solution for any choice problem S, i.e. for 
every S⊆X such that S≠∅, h(S)≠∅. When rule h satisfies this property it is said to be a 
choice function. 
 
The standard choice rule is the maximization rule. Given a preference relation R, this 
rule assigns to any choice problem S the set of the maximal elements in S with respect 
to P. In symbols, 
µ (SR)={x∈S: there is no y∈S such that yPx}.5 
 
If R is complete, maximization coincides with optimization. The optimization rule 
assigns to any choice set S the set of optimal elements in S under relation R. In symbols,  
ω (SR)={x∈S: xRy for every y∈S}. 
 
Notice that in Example 2 optimization is a choice function. That means that even if 
optimization is a choice function, there may be reasons why some optimal alternatives 
are preferable to others. 
 
Indirect preference relations 
 
Let (xq)= (x1,.., xn), n≥2 and for any i=1,..,n, xi∈X, be a sequence of alternatives in X. 
We call it linear iff for any i, j=2,..,n-1, (1) x1≠ xi≠ xn; and (2) xi≠ xj. 
 
Let us say that (xq)= (x1,.., xn) is a downward sequence if (1) for any j=1,..,n-1, xjRxj+1, 
and (2) there exists a h=1,..,n-1, such that xhPxh+1. We call it strictly downward if (1) it 
is downward, and (2) for any j=1,..,n-1, xjPxj+1. 
 
Let us say that alternative x is indirectly preferred to alternative y, in symbols xy, iff 
(1) there is a linear and downward sequence (cq)= (c1,.., cr) such that x=c1 and y=cr, and 
there is no linear and downward sequence (dq)= (d1,.., ds) such that y=d1 and x=ds. 
 
                                                 
4
 The domain of the choice rule may be restricted to a proper subclass of non-empty subsets of X (cf. 
Richter, 1971; Moulin, 1985: 149). This paper does not follow this restriction. 
5
 Notice that in Example 2 optimization is a choice function. This means that even if optimization is a 
choice function, there may be reasons why some optimal alternatives are preferable to others.  
Something similar may be said about the condition proposed in Fuchs-Selinger and Mayer 
(2003) based on a concept of domination different from that used by Subiza and Peris and used also in 
this paper. The condition in question is proposed to ensure that there are optimal alternatives in every 
choice problem. In our framework, it requires that for any choice problem S⊆X and any of its subsets 
S’⊆S, there is an option x∈S such that xRy for all y∈S’. Obviously, the condition holds in Example 2, and 
in particular it is satisfied by the choice problem {x, z}. However, it would be preferable to choose {x} 
rather than {x, z}. 
 
Furthermore, we can say that alternative x is strongly and indirectly preferred to 
alternative y, in symbols xy, iff there is a linear and strictly downward sequence 
(aq)=(a1,.., an) such that x=a1 and y=an, and there is no linear and strictly downward 
sequence (bq)=(b1,.., bm) such that y=b1 and x=bm.6  
 
Dominance relations  
 
As pointed out above, Subiza and Peris employ the relation of (weak) dominance as an 
additional criterion for refining the solution generated by maximizing with respect to 
the original preference relation.  
 
Given any weak preference relation  (or a strict preference relation P), let us say that 
option x [weakly] R (or P)-quasi-dominates option y (in the context X) - in symbols 
xy - iff for every z∈X, (1) if yPz then xPz and (2) if zPx then zPy.7 
 
We denote by  the asymmetric part of , and say that x [weakly] R (or P)-dominates 
option y when xy. It should be noted that, by definition,  is reflexive and transitive 
and  is asymmetric and transitive, independently of which properties R may meet. 
Therefore, if X is finite, then µ(. is a choice function. Furthermore, it is easy to 
check that if P is transitive, then x	 implies x	 and, therefore, µ(.⊆ ⊆µ(..  
 
When R is not complete it is possible that xRz while y R z for some z may occur. 
Therefore, in the eventuality that preferences may not be complete, the following 
dominance relation may also be relevant: xRdy iff (1) xRDy , (2)for all z such that x≠z≠y, 
if zRx then zRy, and (3) for all v such that x≠v≠y, if yRv then xRv. Let us denote by Pd 
the asymmetric part of Rd. As before, those definitions directly imply that (1) Rd is 
reflexive and transitive, (2) Pd is asymmetric and transitive, and (3) µ(.Pd) is a choice 
function. 
 
Substitution rules and refinements 
 
Let us call choice environment any pair (X, R) where X is a non-empty set and R is a 
preference relation defined on X. Given a class Γ of choice environments, a substitution 
rule is a function f that assigns a choice environment to every choice environment in the 
class Γ.  
 
Let us say that a substitution rule f potentially refines the choice environment (X, R) if 
for any choice problem S⊆X, (1) µ(SR’)≠∅, and (2) µ(SR’)⊆µ(SR), where (X , 
P’)=f(X, R). The rule f refines the choice environment (X, P) if (1) it potentially refines 
this environment, and (2) there exists a S’⊆X such that µ(S’R’)⊂ µ(S’R). 
 
Let us say, in addition, that a substitution rule f (1) is a potential refinement for the class 
Γ  if it potentially refines all the choice environments in such a class; and that (2) it is a 
                                                 
6
 Since R is acyclic, =P∞, where P∞ is the transitive closure of P. 
7
 As Subiza and Peris (2002: 4) point out with regards to the dominance relation: ‘This relation is 
somewhat similar to the ‘covering relation’ defined by Miller (1977) and Fishburn (1977) for tournaments 
(complete [and asymmetric] preference relations) and later extended for general preference relations in 
Schwartz (1986)’. 
 
refinement for the class Γ if it potentially refines all the choice environments in such a 
class, and it refines at least one of such environments.  
 
Posed in those terms, the question to be addressed is how the preference and dominance 
relations that can be defined on the basis of R in the way shown in this section - namely, 
the relations PD, Pd, , ,  and - can help to refine the class of all the choice 
environments (X, R) where X is a finite set and R is an acyclic preference relation (let us 
call such environments here after finite and asymmetric choice environments).  
 
 
3.- COMBINING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT DOMINANCE RELATIONS 
 
Let (X, R) any finite and acyclic choice environment. It should be noted that R may not 
be transitive, nor even quasi-transitive. Notice, moreover, that since R is acyclic then µ 
is a choice function, i.e. for every non-empty S⊆X, µ(SR)≠∅ (Moulin, 1985: 151). 
 
In the case that the original preference relation R0≠R is reflexive but not necessarily 
acyclic, P, I and R can be defined in the following way:  
(1) xPy iff (a) xP0y and (b) there is not any sequence (a1,.., an) such that y= a1, and x= 
a
n
, for any i=1,.., n-1, aiP0ai+1, and anP0a1.  This definition implies that P is acyclic. 
(2) xIy iff (a) xI0y or (b) there is a sequence (a1,.., an) such that y= a1, and x= an, for any 
i=1,.., n-1, aiP0ai+1, and anP0a1.   
(3)  xRy iff xPy or xIy. 
 
We have remarked above that in the standard framework the strong preference relation 
P may be understood as a criterion for excluding from choice those alternatives that are 
worse than another according to it. In an similar way, the induced strict preference and 
dominance relations that have been introduced in the preceding section - namely, the 
relations PD, Pd, , ,  and - may be seen as additional criteria for rejecting those 
alternatives that, according to any one of them, are worse than another. 
 
Let (P∪PD) denote the relation ‘xPy or xPDy’. Obviously, if µ(SR)∩µ(SRD)≠∅ then 
that relation potentially refines the environment (X, R) because trivially 
µ(SR)∩µ(SRD)⊆µ(SR). 
 
Abusing of notation, let (P∪PD∪∪) denote the relation ‘xPy or xPDy or xy or 
xy’. It is also trivial that the relation (P∪PD∪∪) potentially refines the 
environment (X, R), if µ(SR)∩µ(SRD)∩µ(S)∩µ(S)≠∅. 8 
 
It should be noted, however, that since P is acyclic,  is transitive. Therefore, 
µ(S)⊆µ(S).  On the other hand, µ(S)=µ(SR), because if xPy then xy, and for 
any z∈X, if there exists a v such that vz then there exists a w such that wPz. Therefore, 
the relation (PD∪) can help in refining the environment (X, R) at least as much as the 
relation (P∪PD∪∪) might do. 
 
In addition, the following result is straightforward. 
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 Apologies for this abuse of notation. 
 Lemma 1.- The relation (PD∪) is transitive. 
 
HINT.- It follows from the transitivity of PD and , and from the following, easily 
verified fact: if (xPDy and xy) or (xy and yPDz), then xz. 
 
Hence, µ(SRD)∩µ(S)≠∅, so that the environment (XRD∪) potentially refines 
the environment (X, R). 
 
The following two examples show that the relations PD and  are logically 
independent from the other, in the sense that (1) there are cases where for some 
alternatives xPDy but not xy, and (2) there are cases where for some alternatives xy 
but not xPDy. 
 
Example 3.- xPz, xPv, yPv and vPz. In this case, xPDy but not xy. 
Example 4.- xPz, yPv and zPv. In this case, xy but not xPDy. 
 
Notice, also, that the relation  is transitive.9 
Next, in order to potentially refine the environment (X, R) with the help of the relations 
PD, ,   and Pd, let us now define the relations  and  on their basis: 
 
(1) if x, y∉µ(XPD∪), then x y iff, xPDy or x; 
(2) if x∈µ(XPD∪), and y∉µ(XPD∪),  
then x y; 
(3) if x, y∈µ(XPD∪), then x y iff xy; 
(4) if [x∈µ(µ(XPD∪) and 
 y∉µ(µ(XPD∪)], then x y; 
(5) if x, y∈µ(µ(XPD∪), then x y iff xPdy; and 
(6) x y iff not y x. 
 
With regard to this new relation, consider the following result. 
 
Lemma 2.- The relation  is transitive. 
 
PROOF.-  
If x y and y z, then there are only five possible cases:  
 
(1) x∈µ(µ(XPD∪)  and z∉µ(µ(XPD∪) ; 
(2) x∈µ(XPD∪), and z∉µ(XPD∪); 
(3) x, y, z∈µ(µ(XPD∪) ; 
(4) x, y, z∈µ(XPD∪); and  
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 In contrast, if R is not complete, then  may not be transitive, as the following example shows: 
a
1Ia2Pa3Ia4=b1Pb2Ib3Ib4, where a2=b3. It is true that a1a4=b1, and a4=b1b4, but there is no downward 
linear sequence (cq)=(c1,.., cr) such that a1=c1 y b4=cr. 
 
(5) x, y, z∉µ(XPD∪). 
 
In cases (1) and (2), x z by definition. 
In cases (3), (4) and (5), the transitivity of Pd,  and (PD∪) implies x z. Q.E.D. 
 
Obviously, Lemma 2 implies thatµ(. )=µ(µ(µ(SPD∪)Rd) is a choice 
function. 
 
Let us now turn to the question whether the relation  can help in refining the class of 
the finite and acyclic choice environments (XR). 
 
Theorem 1.- (a) The choice environment (X ) potentially refines the choice 
environment (XR). (b) Let f be the substitution rule that assigns to any choice 
environment (X’R’) the environment (X’ ’), where ’ is induced by R’ in the same 
way that R induces . The rule f is a potential refinement for the class of all the finite 
and acyclic choice environments. 
 
PROOF.- In regard with (a), since R is acyclic, if xPy then xy. Thus, 
y∉µ(XPD∪). If x∈µ(XPD∪), then by definition, x y. If, on the contrary, 
x∉µ(XPD∪), then xy implies x y. Therefore, if xPy then x y. Hence, µ(. ) is a 
choice function. On the other hand, since xy implies x y, then for any S⊆X, µ(S
)⊆µ(SP). In regard with (b), notice that (XP) is any finite and acyclic choice 
environment. Q.E.D. 
 
In order to show that the substitution rule f is a refinement for the class of all the finite 
and acyclic choice environments (X’R’), notice that in both examples 3 and 4, µ({x, y, 
z, v}R)={x, y} while µ({x, y, z, v}(PD∪)={x}. 
 
It should be noted, additionally, that there are cases where  
(1) µ(µ(XPD∪) ⊂µ(XPD∪, and 
(2) µ(µ(µ(XPD∪) xPdy) ⊂µ(µ(XPD∪) . 
 
With regard to case (1), consider the following example: 
 
Example 5.- xPy, xIz, zPv, vIw, wPr; µ({x, y, z, v, w, r}PD∪={x, z, w},  
while µ(µ({x, y, z, v, w, r}PD∪) = {x, z}. 
 
With regard to case (2), consider the example: 
 
Example 6.- xIy, z; µ(µ({x, y, z}PD∪) ={x, y, z}, while µ(µ(µ({x, y, 
z}PD∪) Rd)={x, y}. 
 
Thus, these examples show that we should not dispense with relation  nor with 
relation Rd. 
 
It should also be noted that as R approaches being complete and transitive, the induced 
combined relation  becomes both simpler and closer to the original preferences, as the 
following theorem shows. 
Theorem 2.-   
(1) If P is transitive, then  
 (1.b) µ(RD)⊆ µ(R); 
(1.a) P=; therefore, PD=;  
 (1.c) hence, the relation  can be defined in the following equivalent way: 
(1) if x, y∉µ(XRD), then x y iff, xPDy; 
(2) if x∈µ(XRD), and y∉µ(XRD), then x y; 
(3) if x, y∈µ(XRD), then x y iff xy; 
(4) if [x∈µ(µ(XRD) and  y∉µ(µ(XPD)], then x y; 
(5) if x, y∈µ(µ(XRD), then x y iff xPdy;  
 and (1.d) for any S⊆X, µ(S )=µ(µ(µ(SRD)Rd). 
(2) If P is transitive and R is both PI-transitive and IP-transitive, then 
 (2.a) P=; therefore, PD=;  
 (2.b) µ(XRD)=µ(µ(XRD)); 
 (2.c) therefore, the relation  can be defined in the following equivalent way: 
(1) if x, y∉µ(XRD), then x y iff, xPDy; 
(2) if x∈µ(XRD), and y∉µ(XRD), then x y; 
(3) if x, y∈µ(XRD), then x y iff xPdy; 
and (2.d) for any S⊆X, µ(S )=µ(µ(SRD)Rd). 
(3) If R is complete, then 
(3.a) PD=Pd; 
(3.b) µ(XPD∪)=µ(µ(XPD∪));  
(3.c) hence, the relation  can be defined in the following equivalent way: 
(1) if x, y∉µ(XPD∪), then x y iff, xPDy or x y ; 
(2) if x∈µ(XPD∪), and y∉µ(XPD∪), then x y; 
(3.d) therefore, for any S⊆X, µ(S )=µ(SPD∪). 
(4) If R is complete and P is transitive, then 
(4.a) the relation  can be defined in the following equivalent way: 
(1) if x, y∉µ(XRD), then x y iff, xPDy; 
(2) if x∈µ(XRD), and y∉µ(XRD), then x y; 
(4.b) therefore, for any S⊆X, µ(S )=µ(SRD). 
(5) If P is transitive and R is complete, PI-transitive and IP-transitive, then 
 (5.a) P=PD; thus 
(5.b) x y iff xPy, and therefore x y iff xRy; 
(5.c) hence, for any S⊆X, µ(S )=µ(SR). 
 
PROOF.- 
The only point that may not seem obvious is the point (3.b). To prove it, let (1) R be 
complete, (2) x≠y, (3) x, y∈µ(XP), and (4) x, y∈µ(XRD). Next, let us assume that there 
is a downward linear sequence (aq)=(a1,..,an) such that x=a1 and y=an. Let ai be the last 
component of (aq) such that aiPai+1. Since x, y∈µ(XR) and R is complete, xRai, yRai, 
xRan-1 and an-1Iy. Since x, y∈µ(XRD), if xPan-1 then there is a z such that yPzRx and the 
the point (3.b) would hold. Thus, an-1Ix. Then, the sequence (y, ai, ai+1,.., ai+1, ai+2,.., an-2, 
a
n-1
, x) such that yRai or y=ai, aiPai+1, ai+1Iai+2,.., an-2Ian-1, an-1I x is linear and 
downward. Hence, if there is a downward linear sequence (a1,..,an) such that x=a1 and 
y=an, then there is another downward linear sequence (b1,..,bm) such that y=b1 and y=bm. 
So, neither xy, nor xy. Thus, µ(XPD∪)=µ(µ(XPD∪)). Q.E.D. 
 
It should be noted that when R is complete, neither  nor Pd helps in selecting a proper 
subset of µ(XPD∪). We can therefore, in this case, dispense with them in defining 
the relation . 
 
Let us now turn to another question. Given a substitution rule f and a given class Γ 0 of 
choice environments, let be Γi the class Γi ={(X’, R’): there is an environment (X, R)∈Γ 
i-1
 such that (X’, R’)=f(X, R)}, for any i= 1,….. Imagine that for every i, Γ i is a 
refinement for the class Γ i-1. At which stage should the search for the finest selection of 
maximal alternatives stop?10 
This indeterminacy would be avoided if, for any i=1 the rule f is not a refinement for  
Γi-1, in the sense that for any environment (X, R)∈Γ i, (X, R)=f(X, R). In particular, this 
implies that that for any environment (X, R)∈Γ 0, f(X, R)⊆(X, R).  However, the 
procedure of inducing the preference relations  and  from a finite and acyclic choice 
environment does not even satisfy this property for Γ 0, as the following example 
shows: 
Example 7.- xPy, xPw, zPv, zPw, vPw. Notice that R is quasi-transitive, and that neither 
xPDz, nor xz, nor zPDx, nor zx. Therefore, x z. But xPDa for any a such that zPDa, 
and there is a b such xPDb and not zPDb. Therefore,  xz, where  is the relation 
induced by  in the same way that R induces . 
 
4.- TOWARDS A MORE DEMANDING CHOICE CRITERION 
 
Whilst  is transitive, the induced relation of weak preference  may be not. As a 
consequence, maximizing in respect of  may fail to satisfy the strongest among the 
standard consistency conditions such as Arrow’s Condition [if S⊆T and h(T)∩S≠∅, 
then h(T)∩S= h(S)] and Sen’s β Condition [if S⊆T and h(T)∩h(S)≠∅, then h(S) ⊆ h(T)], 
for instance. (For a summary of such conditions see Moulin, 1985). 
 
Nevertheless, since X is finite and µ(. is a choice function, µ(. induces a 
complete pre-order in the way that described below. Therefore, maximizing in respect 
of that preorder satisfies all of the above mentioned standard consistency conditions on 
choice functions.  
 
Imagine that S is a proper subset of set T, that x is selected by µ(. in T and S, and 
that y is chosen by µ(. in S but not in T. Since T is larger than S, x is chosen in a 
more demanding environment than y. According to the intuition behind the criterion that 
we are introducing, this is why x exhibits a certain asymmetry over y. Hence, since x is 
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 This question was suggested to me by Josep Peris. 
 
also selected in S, it makes sense to advocate that the choice of y in S should be 
discarded.11 
 
In order to apply this suggestion, consider the sequence A1, A2, .., Ar of subsets of X 
such that (a) A1= X; (b) Ai= Ai-1-µ(Ai-1; and (c) Ar=∅, Ar-1≠∅, where i=2,.., r. Given 
that X is finite and µ(. is a choice function, such a sequence exists and is unique. In 
addition, it is a partition of X. Thus, for every x∈X there is one and only one Ai such that 
(1) x∈µ(Ai and (2) for every j>i, x∉µ(Aj.  Let Ax denote this set, and let us 
define the following induced preference relation: xy iff Ai=Ax and Aj=Ay and i≤ j. 
 
It is easy to check that the relation   is reflexive, complete and transitive, in other 
words, that it is a complete pre-order. In consequence, maximizing with respect to it (1) 
is a choice function; (2) it coincides with optimizing with respect to  ; and (c) both 
choice rules satisfy the most demanding consistency conditions such as those mentioned 
above. 
 
Like the relation , the relation xy helps in potentially refining the class of all the 
finite and acyclic choice environments (XR). Notice in this respect that, by definition, 
if x y then xy. Hence, for all S⊆X, µ(S)⊆ µ(S ). Morover, as it is stated in the 
proof of Theorem 1, xPy implies x y. Thus, it is ensued that if xPy then xy, and that 
µ(S’)⊆ µ(S’R) for any S’⊆X,. In other words, the choice environment (X) 
potentially refines the choice environment (XR). In consequence, the substitution rule f 
is a potential refinement for the class of all the finite and acyclic choice environments 
(X’R’), where f’ is the substitution rule that assigns to any choice environment (X’R’) 
the environment (X’’) and ’ is induced by R’ in the same way that R induces  .  
 
In addition, each of the examples 3-6 shows the existence of a finite space of 
alternatives X, a reflexive and acyclic preference relation R defined on X, and a non-
empty choice set S⊆X such that µ(S)⊂µ(SR). 
 
The question, then, is whether introducing relation   adds something to the work done 
by  in refining the class of the finite and acyclic choice environments (X’R’), that is, 
whether are there cases where µ(S’)⊂µ(S’ ). 
 
The following example shows the answer to be affirmative: 
 
Example 8.- rPx, rPv, sPt, sPy, sPz, xPv, tPy, tPz, yPz. Notice that µ({x, y, z, v} )= 
={x, y} wilst µ({x, y, z, v})={x}, because x y, x v, x z, y v, y z, but x t and xa 
for any a∈{y, z, v}. 
 
We have shown above that xPy implies xy. Additionally, it is easy to check that if  
satisfies the properties of PI-transitivity and IP-transitivity, then = . Thus, as a 
corollary of Theorem 2, it is also easy to confirm that if R is complete, PI-transitive and 
IP-transitive, then R= = . 
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It is remarkable, however, that the refinement procedures proposed in this paper may 
fail to satisfy Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives [given any choice rule h, 
if R and R’ have the same restriction on a choice problem S⊆, then h(SR)= h(SR’)], 
in the following sense. 
 
Consider the choice rule (.R”) such that (SR”)=µ(S ), for any S⊆ X, and the 
choice rule (SR”) such that (SR”)=µ(S). Let (X, R) and (X, R’) be two choice 
environments such that  X is finite and both R and R’ are reflexive and acyclic. It can be 
easily checked that there may be an S⊆X where R and R’ have the same restriction and 
such that (SR)≠(SR’), or (SR)≠ (SR’), or both. 
 
Notice, for such choice functions, that in order to choose from any S it is necessary to 
gather information about the available comparisons between any alternatives in X and in 
S as well as those out of this set. In addition, if S is not a set in the sequence A1, A2, .., 
Ar, (SR)  is the subset of alternatives in S that are chosen because they should be 
chosen in another larger choice problem. 
 
Indeed, the refinement procedures shown in this paper may fail to satisfy the following 
weaker condition on reversion of preferences: Let (X, R) and (X’, R’) be two choice 
environments such that X’ is finite, X⊆X’ and both R and R’ are reflexive and acyclic. If 
x y (xy) then not y ’x (not y’x).12  
With this in mind, consider the following example: 
 
Example 9.- X={x, y, z, v, w}; X’={x, y, z, v, w}∪{r}; xPy, xPz, xPw, vPw; and xP’y, 
xP’z, xP’w, vP’w, vP’r, rP’x. Therefore, xPDy, xPDz, xPDv, xPDw, x v, xv and 
{x}=(XR)=(XR). However, not xv; on the contrary, vx, vy, vz, 
vw and vr; hence v ’x, v’x and {v}=(X’R’)=(X’R’). 
 
Now, let  be the function that assigns the environment (X, ) to the choice 
environment (X, R) in the way shown in the preceding section, let  be the function 
that assigns the environment (X, ) to the choice environment (X, ) in the way shown 
in this section, and let =  . Given that   is reflexive, complete and transitive, 
(X, )=(X, R)= ((X, R)). However, the risk of indeterminacy does not disappear, 
because its source is . For example, it might be the case that ”⊂ ’, where 
(X, ”)=(((X, R))) and (X, ’)=((X, R))). 
It should be noted, in addition, that for large choice problems S, µ(S ’) may be ‘too 
large’. 
 
 
5.- SUMMARY  
 
When the set of maximal alternatives in a choice problem is not a singleton,  
                                                 
12
 In contrast, this condition is satisfied by each of the six relations used in the paper as additional 
rejection criteria, namely, PD, Pd, , ,  and . 
 
 it is common practice to interpret that the last choice will end up being made by some 
random procedure, assigning to any maximal alternative the same probability of being 
chosen. However, there may be reasons based on the same original preferences for 
which it is suitable to select certain maximal alternatives over others.  
 
In that respect, this paper follows the strategy of defining additional criteria induced by 
the original preferences and apply them for rejecting alternatives from being chosen and 
then accepting the rest. Specifically, six preference relations have been introduced to 
that end, namely: the dominance relation PD defined on the basis of the original strict 
preference P, a second dominance relation Pd also defined on the basis of P, the indirect 
preference relation , the dominance relation defined on the basis of , the indirect 
preference relation  and the corresponding dominance relation . 
 
First, it has been shown that the relation (PD∪) is transitive (in Lemma 1) and that 
maximizing with respect to it is a choice function, and it has been remarked  
that the relation (PD∪) can help in refining the finite and acyclic choice environment 
(X, R) at least as much as the relation (P∪PD∪∪) might do. In addition, by means 
of examples 3 and 4 it has been also shown that the relations PD and  are logically 
independent one from the other. 
 
Next, given that the relations (PD∪),  and Pd are transitive, the combined induced 
relation  has been defined using those relations for that task. After showing that  is 
transitive and that maximizing with respect to it is a choice function, Theorem 1 states 
that the substitution rule  that assigns the relation  to the finite and acyclic choice 
environment (X, R) potentially refines the class of the finite and acyclic choice 
environments. Moreover, theorems 3-6 shows that  is a refinement for such a class of 
choice environments, showing also that the relations may  and Pd may mean that 
maximizing with respect to  provides a finer solution that maximizing with respect to 
(PD∪). 
 
It has also been shown, in Theorem 2, that as R approaches being complete and 
transitive, the relation  becomes both simpler and closer to the original preferences. A 
salient corollary of this theorem is that the approach proposed in this paper may be more 
useful when the original preferences are incomplete. 
Section 3 finished pointing out that applying  for refining the original choice 
environment may generate indeterminacy as to when should stop the selection of 
maximal alternatives. 
 
By exploiting the fact that X is finite, the preorder   induced by  has been introduced. 
Since it is complete and transitive,   satisfies the most demanding standard consistency 
requirements. It has been also stated that the substitution rule  that assigns the 
relation   to the environment (X, R) is a refinement for the class of the finite and 
acyclic choice environments. And it has been shown that maximizing with respect to    
not only helps in refining the finite and acyclic choice environment (X, R) at least as 
much as the maximizing with respect to , but also that there are cases where 
maximizing with respect to   provides a more selective solution.  
 
Given that  and  use information from any part of the space X, it is not surprising that 
these relations may fail to meet Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. In 
fact, they may fail likewise to meet the weaker condition on the reversion of preferences 
introduced at the end of Section 4, a condition satisfied by each of the six relations used 
as additional rejection criteria in this paper. 
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